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ABSTRACT 
 
JUSTIFYING WAR IN UKRAINE: AN ANALYSIS OF SPEECHES, EXCERPTS 
AND INTERVIEWS BY VLADIMIR PUTIN 
 
 
 
By 
Irene Goudimiak 
May 2016 
 
Thesis supervised by Dr. Jennie Schulze and Dr. Mark Haas  
For two years now the war in Southeast Ukraine has claimed approximately 
10,000 lives and countless casualties. Pegged as a civil war, the conflict is waging on 
between pro-Western nationalists and pro-Russian separatists. The war ignited after the 
public ousting of President Yanukovch in Maidan Square in the midst of thousands of 
protesters, and the subsequent annexation of Crimea. Although the Russian Federation 
maintains it does not have a military presence in Ukraine, U.S. intelligence and 
Ukrainian military officials have evidence otherwise. As a result, the West has imposed 
significant sanctions on “Putin’s Russia”. This study explores how Putin justifies the 
Russian incursion into Ukraine through his own rhetoric, and further, whether this 
rhetoric changes when speaking to a domestic versus international audience. In the 
context of framing, this study analyzes 57 speeches, interviews, and excerpts of 
  v 
Vladimir Putin focused on the Crisis in Ukraine, from the years of 2013 to 2016. 
Throughout the literature, Kin-state rallying, Russian encirclement by enemies/isolation, 
Russian ethnocentrism, blurred legal rhetoric, and manipulation of historical myth, are 
the predominant frames that emerge. By way of propaganda, the findings indicate that 
Putin’s most frequently used justifications frame the conflict through Russia’s necessity 
to protect its brother nation from an unstable government, and the projection of blame 
onto the West. In effect, this study not only emphasizes the significance and 
implications of framing by elites in conflict, it also sheds light on the current debate over 
Putin’s motivations in Ukraine.  
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Introduction 
 
 A mere two decades have passed since Ukraine became an independent nation on 
August 24th, 1991. Yet once again, the young nation is forced to defend its language, 
livelihood and sovereignty from an all too familiar intruder. For centuries, Ukraine has 
been divided under the rule of several Empires (Molchanov, 2015, p. 3). The trends of 
masked aggression remain the same only this time it is Russian President Vladimir Putin 
leading the assault from the Kremlin. The rules of the game have changed, however, and 
in the current global climate a recognized bout of aggression is too costly for Putin to 
risk. Yet, in the midst of crisis in Ukraine and the backdrop of global turmoil, Putin has 
been able to pursue his imperialistic ambitions. The Kremlin officially denies any 
incursion into Ukraine, and Putin has presented himself as a concerned bystander: 
seeking a peaceful solution to the civil conflict raging on the territory of his brother 
country.  
 Ten thousand lives have been lost in the three years since war broke out on the 
Southeastern border of Ukraine and the death toll continues to rise (Bebler, 2015, p. 13). 
Dissatisfactions with the Ukrainian government first emerged among the Ukrainian 
people after President Yanukovych backed out of a deal with the European Union in 
order to foster warmer relations with Russia. To counter the EU financial package and 
keep Ukraine within the regional economic arena, Putin offered 15 billion dollars in aid 
to Ukraine, effectively breaking the EU-Ukraine deal (Tsygankov, 2015, p. 284). Inspired 
by their victory in the Orange Revolution of 2004, the enraged public decided to, once 
again, take the political fate of Ukraine into their own hands. The broken EU deal was the 
final straw in the cascade of Russian-leaning decisions made by the pro-Kremlin 
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Yanukovych, accused by many of being a puppet of Putin’s (“60 Minutes,” 2015, p. 13). 
And in a flash, thousands of peaceful protesters gathered in the capital’s Maidan Square, 
teeming with passion and hope for a better future. The protests lasted from November 
2013 to February 2014 when the corrupt President Yanykovych was finally ousted and 
forced to flee the country out of fear for his life. He fled to Russia (BBC News, 2016, p. 
2).   
 The atmosphere of the protests changed from peace to violence. Enraged 
protesters battled the rigid and merciless Berkut police. Aided by only flimsy shields and 
tattered coats, the protesters fought with solidarity against the armed Berkut and trained 
hidden snipers. The capital was engulfed in violence and fire. The uprising eventually 
settled leaving behind the “heavenly hundred,” the official reference to those that 
perished in Maidan for the sake of the nation (Yakimovich, 2015, P. 1). The scene was a 
mess of Molotov cocktails and shots fired. Kidnappings, tortures, and disappearances 
were reported throughout the uprising. It took months to rehabilitate the square to its 
former beauty and re-instill confidence into the souls of the embattled civilians 
(Gatehouse, 2015, p. 5). It was already in this stage of the crisis that the protesters noticed 
a slew of unfamiliar faces. Uniforms unmarked, yet recognizable, these anonymous 
soldiers aimed their military weapons at the unarmed people (Bebler, 2015, p. 7). These 
Russian “volunteers” were only the first glimpse of what was to come in eastern Ukraine 
(Lanoszka, 2016, p. 4), as tensions slowly began to mount.  
 The unlawful annexation of Crimea was Russia’s next phase of involvement. It 
was the perfect scenario for Putin, who had the return of Crimea to Russia on his radar 
for years (Gvosdev, 2014, p. 5). A historically Russian territory, Crimea was given to the 
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Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic by Nikita Krushchev as a “symbolic gesture” to 
promote good relations with the Soviet Union. This bid also held an ulterior political 
motive, which was to garner support for Krushchev as General Secretary by the 
Ukrainian SSR. From then on it remained an autonomous Republic of Ukraine, populated 
by Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars (Gvosdev 2014, p. 3). While the large 
majority of the population was ethnically Russians, all groups lived together in harmony. 
The Maidan uprising, however, proved to have a greater impression on the nation than 
expected. It awakened a sense of Ukrainian nationalism and effectively hardened the 
previously muted ethnic boundaries.  
 In the wake of Maidan, ethnic Russians and Russian-leaning Ukrainians began to 
seek solace in Russia as Ukraine approached internal collapse (Motyl, 2015). It was the 
perfect pretext for Putin to step in. Amidst fear, chaos and separation, Putin came to the 
rescue of his ethnic kin. Solidified in 1999, and continually expanding, Russia’s 
Compatriot Act has been a staple in its foreign policy: vowing to protect Russian 
compatriots stranded outside of Russia’s borders following the breakup of the Soviet 
Union (Zekam, Saunders, Antoun, 2015, pp.16-18). Putin contends that with the fall of 
the USSR many ethnic Russians became foreigners. In the ousting of the pro-Russian 
Yanukovych and the formation of a Western-leaning interim government, Russian 
speakers in Crimea and the east began to fear for the viability of their future in the 
independent Ukraine (Motyl, 2015). In such a permissive environment, Crimea was 
swiftly and efficiently sliced from the map of Ukraine and returned to Russia “without a 
single shot fired” (Anonymous, 2014, p. 2). Putin organized a referendum, which resulted 
in the decision of the Crimean people to return to Russia. Involving armed guards and 
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bribes the referendum remains unrecognized and unlawful by the international 
community (Bebler, 2015, p. 8).  
 The main component of this Crisis is the ongoing war in the eastern ‘Donbas’ 
region of Ukraine that shares a border with Russia. Almost in tandem with the annexation 
of Crimea, various anti-government protests erupted in the industrial east of Ukraine 
(Tsygankov, 2015, p. 285). Pro-Russian and anti-government groups, angered by the 
overthrow of the Donbas-born president, began to assert their claim over the region and 
their staunch disapproval of the new Western-leaning interim government. Bolstered by 
Russia’s encouragement, the activists formed into the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) 
and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR)- representing the two major cities in the 
Donbas region. These pro-Russian rebels and separatists began to violently seize official 
buildings and territories, viciously asserting their malcontent with the new leadership. 
The primary grievance of the groups was a lack of adequate representation for the people 
in the east under Kiev’s new leadership. 
 As the Ukrainian government attempted to suppress these rebels the conflict 
escalated to a civil war between pro-Ukrainian nationalists in the west and pro-Russian 
rebels in the east. It also surfaced that Russian tanks and forces were doing a lot more 
than “purely humanitarian work” and were aiding the rebels (Luhn, 2015, p.1). Backed 
by U.S. intelligence, the Ukrainian government claims that Russia invaded sovereign 
Ukrainian territory in August 2014 marking an act of war and outright aggression. 
Although the Kremlin maintains its non-involvement by stating that Russian fighters in 
Ukraine are volunteers, physical evidence has mounted that there are indeed Russian 
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military personnel within the borders of Ukraine numbering in the thousands (Luhn, 
2015, p 1).  
In an attempt to quell the Crisis in Ukraine, there have been two Agreements 
formulated in Minsk, Belarus. The first round of agreements, entitled Minsk I, were 
finalized on September 5th, 2014. Ukraine, Russia, and the People’s Republics of Donetsk 
and Luhansk were the signatories. Under observance of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, the agreement was meant to stop the fighting in Donbas with an 
immediate ceasefire. Unfortunately, Minsk I failed soon after it’s signing (Bern, 2014). 
The subsequent protocol, Minsk II, was signed on February 12th, 2015 and intended to 
reform and reinvigorate the previous agreement. Signed by Germany, France, Ukraine 
and Russia, Minsk II added a few key points to the table. The most prominent points 
included an immediate and full bilateral ceasefire, a withdrawal of heavy weapons from 
both sides, a dialogue on local elections in Donbas, constitutional reform in Ukraine, and 
a release of hostages on all sides (Motyl, 2015, p. 2). Minsk II has been extended into 
2016, however, the fighting in the east continues.  
 According to the Kremlin’s official rhetoric, the annexation of Crimea is 
legitimate and Russia’s involvement in the east is purely humanitarian (“Former Kremlin 
internal policy chief,” 2015, p. 5). Factual evidence, however, proves otherwise. Putin’s 
actions have sparked both intrigue and retaliation from the international community. A 
debate has ensued over why he is involved in Ukraine. Response to NATO expansion, 
resurgence of imperialism, and unification of Ukrainian and Russian identity are just a 
few examples. However, this study focuses on how Putin is justifying his actions in 
Ukraine. To understand Russia’s justifications through the lens of Putin himself, this 
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study analyzed 57 interviews, speeches, and excerpts from 2013-2016 that were relevant 
to the Crisis in Ukraine. Taking a glimpse through various frames, this study seeks to 
understand how Putin is justifying his actions in Ukraine to both a domestic and 
international audience.  
 
History and Composition of Ukraine 
To most effectively understand the significance of framing and justifications in 
the current conflict, it is imperative to present a brief history of relations between Russia 
and Ukraine, Ukraine’s ethnic geography, and an outline of key players involved in the 
conflict. By and large, the relationship between Ukraine and Russia has been a 
complicated one. Historically Ukraine’s borders have fluctuated under various conquests. 
In the 17th and 18th centuries, the competition over Ukrainian territories spread between 
the Polish Commonwealth, Muscovy, the Ottoman Empire, and the Crimean Khanate. 
Into the 20th century, Germany, Austria-Hungary, the USSR, Poland, Romania and 
Czechoslovakia all vied for a piece of the ‘breadbasket of Europe’ (Motyl, 2015, p. 2). 
Under Stalin, Ukrainians suffered through mass deportations, labor camps, and a 
fabricated famine that took close to ten million lives (Newnham, 2013, p. 117). Since the 
fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has continued to influence Ukraine both economically, as 
its primary trading partner, and culturally.  
Internally, Ukraine is culturally heterogeneous. Groups within the country are 
distributed regionally. The five primary regions that comprise Ukraine are Western 
Ukraine (Galicia), Central Ukraine, South-Eastern Ukraine, Kyiv City and Crimea 
(Shulman, 2006, p. 253). These five main regions denote particular ethnic and cultural 
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affiliations. For example, the Western and Central Regions are comprised primarily of 
ethnic Ukrainians, while South-Eastern Ukraine is home to the largest concentration of 
ethnic Russians. Crimea is the only region of Ukraine in which the ethnic majority is 
Russian at 64% of the population. In a 2001 survey conducted by Stephen Shulman 
(2006), three categories of respondents (Ukrainians, Russians and ethnic Ukrainians who 
speak Russian) from each region were asked to determine the level of similarity between 
the five regions of Ukraine. Galicia and Donbas emerged as the least similar across the 
board, comprising the two poles of a seemingly bi-polar nation (p. 251). These regional 
differences, especially potent between the east and the west, provided a context of ethnic 
and cultural boundaries conducive to Putin’s intervention in Ukraine.  
Presently, the major players in this conflict can be divided into three distinct 
entities. The first is the Ukrainian government that is centralized in the capital of Kiev, 
which is strongly aligned with western Ukraine. Although Kiev is geographically located 
in central Ukraine it has become associated with the western cities of Lviv, Ternopil and 
Ivano-Frankivsk as a result of the conflict. The second key player is Putin and the 
Russian Federation. From the perspective of the Ukrainian government, Putin is the 
catalyst for much of the chaos occurring in eastern Ukraine. Finally, the very focal point 
of the conflict is located in the disputed region of eastern Ukraine known as the Donbas. 
Donbas is an encompassing term used to describe the oblasts of primarily Donetsk, 
Luhansk, and Mariupol. These regions have historically served as a buffer zone between 
Ukraine and Russia and are central to this conflict.  
 In the Donbas coal basin, inhabitants live in cities and towns that more closely 
resemble villages, with an altogether low standard of living (Osipian, L and Osipian, A 
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2006, p. 497). With a fluctuating history of multinational inhabitants, Donbas is 
overwhelmingly viewed in Ukraine as a unique entity that belongs to Ukraine, but is 
essentially a “no-man’s” land. Much of western Ukraine is ill informed about this region, 
while still viewing it as the industrial epicenter of the country. Most westerners have 
never traveled to the east (Osipian, L and Osipian, A, 2006, p. 496). Its position as a 
buffer zone between Russia and Ukraine, as well as its influx of various inhabitants such 
as Cossacks and Crimean Greeks, has given Donbas a unique identity and value system 
that differs from that of both western Ukraine and Russia. Throughout Ukraine, Donbas 
has the reputation of harboring pro-Russian and Soviet sentiments, possessing viewpoints 
that are the antithesis of Ukrainian independence (Shulman, 2006, p. 251). High levels of 
outside influence contribute to its status as a disputed territory.  
 One of the reasons that the Donbas is so highly disputed is that it is located in the 
eastern and southeastern arc that houses three fourths of Ukraine’s Russian population. 
The Donbas alone contains 3.6 million Russians (Wilson, 1995, p. 267). While the nearby 
regions of Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv, have historical ties to Ukraine, and Crimea has 
historical ties to Russia, the origins of the Donbas region are uncertain. As a result, both 
Russia and Ukraine assert historical claims in the region (Wilson, 1995, p. 268). 
Regardless, the Donbas was included under sovereign Ukrainian territory when Ukraine 
achieved its independence on August 24th, 1991: although its roots continue to be the 
subject of debate.  
Further, Ukraine and Russia both trace their roots back to Kievan Rus; a group of 
Eastern Slavic tribes that ruled from the 9th to 13th centuries (Gvodsev, 2014, p. 4). As 
historical myth is a necessary component of nation building (Smith, 1994, p. 11), this 
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claim is fundamental to the story of both nations. Russia contends that Ukraine, Russia, 
and Belarus can all date their roots to Kievan Rus, suggesting that Ukrainians, Russians 
and Belarusians are all one people. Ukraine contests this theory by stating that Kievan 
Rus predates the Muscovite state, denying Russia’s statehood in Kievan Rus (Molchanov, 
2015, p. 4). In modern times, this contradiction serves as a significant rift in Ukrainian 
and Russian relations. As Putin puts it, “… we are not simply close neighbors but, as I 
have said many times already, we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. 
Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other (Putin, March 
18th 2014, p. 10).” This rift is key in Putin’s ability to frame the current conflict.    
 
How is Putin Framing His Actions? - A Review of the Literature  
 
The Debate on Putin’s Motivations 
 
The ongoing and relevant nature of the Crisis corresponds to the many analyses 
targeted at understanding Putin’s motivations for involvement in Ukraine. Mearsheimer, 
McFaul and Sestanovich (2014) present the most relevant debate on what prompted 
Putin’s incursion into sovereign Ukraine. Mearsheimer, among other realists, suggests 
that Russia is acting aggressively to counter NATO expansion. Since Ukraine serves as a 
buffer state, a potential shift to the West would place NATO right on Russia’s doorstep 
and would threaten its security (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 4). McFaul and Sestanovich 
suggest that Putin’s actions are borne out of consideration for regime consolidation and 
internal stability. The annexation of Crimea is, thus, a direct result of Russia’s domestic 
hardships, particularly the dwindling economy (Mearsheimer, McFaul & Sestanovich, 
2014, p. 1-3).  
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Further, Andrei Tsygankov (2015) views Putin’s actions in Ukraine in the larger 
scope of continued hostilities between Russia and the West. It is Russia’s ethnocentrism 
and U.S. ethno-phobia that contribute to this tension (p. 287). Masha Gessen (2015) 
suggests that war is an integral part of the Russian culture. Russia is only at peace in a 
time of war. These brief periods of peace are only anomalies: a time of preparation for 
the next aggressive act, incursion, or invasion (Pg. 3). The war in Ukraine is, thus, in 
perfect character for the nation that thrives off of unrest and conflict (Gessen, 2015, p. 2). 
Lilia Shevstova (2015) adds to this argument by suggesting that Russia’s actions are 
borne out weakness rather than strength. She posits that Russia’s domestic and internal 
grievances are effectively externalized as Russian economy and leadership are strained 
for survival.  
 Although these sources seek to explain what motivated Putin to act aggressively 
in Ukraine, this study focuses on how Putin is justifying his actions to both a domestic 
and international audience. The literature is, thus, based on the use of strategic framing in 
foreign policy and, more specifically, the significance and implications of framing in 
Putin’s actions and policy toward Ukraine. Several key frames emerge in the literature 
including kin-state rallying, encirclement by enemies, Russian ethnocentrism, legal 
rhetoric and manipulation of historical myth and memory. In addition, Putin’s use of 
propaganda in effectively framing the conflict is also analyzed.  
 
Framing Issues in Foreign Policy  
 
 Erving Goffman (1974) was the first to describe framing as a way for us to 
organize the world. A pioneer in the field of sociology, Goffman wrote extensively on the 
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significance and rationale of framing in our everyday lives. Frame analysis, he describes, 
is a method of studying how a particular situation is defined and our rationale behind it 
(Goffman, 1974, p. 1). Following suit, James Druckman (2009) evaluated the 
significance of framing in communications and political science, studying the effect of 
strong frames versus weak frames in a series of experiments. He found that in political 
science, framing could be used strategically to influence public support and policy (p.19).  
Framing is a powerful tool: In essence, it is an influence over perception. In the 
policy sphere, framing is often used by elites to indicate a problem and promote a 
solution (Druckman, 2009, p.18). Historically, leaders have used framing as a way to 
guide the outlook of and garner support for particular conflicts. In this way, they are able 
to justify the actions they make on the international sphere (Mintz & Redd, 2013, p.193). 
Putin’s framing of the conflict in Ukraine has been a vital tool in directing public 
perception. With the use of mass propaganda, Putin has utilized various frames to present 
the war in Ukraine as a civil war and an effort by the Russian Federation to protect its 
ethnic kin from the fascist Ukrainian government and meddling West.   
 
Propaganda Machine 
 
Putin has been able to essentially control the mindset of the Russian public 
through his restrictions placed on all public media, news, and Internet sources 
(Kornblum, 2015, p. 2). The Russian public sees what Putin wants them to see. 
Practically all state-run channels are under the control of the Kremlin, with only a 
handful of (semi) independent stations remaining (The Public Diplomat, 2014, p. 1). 
Keeping a bird's eye view over daily Russian life, Putin is able to manipulate the public’s 
  12 
perspective to favor Putin, the Kremlin, and Russia’s foreign policy (Heritage, 2013, p. 1-
2). There are four distinct components to Putin’s propaganda machine (Komarnyckyj, 
2014, p. 4-5). The first component is an emphasis on Russian greatness. In contrast, the 
West is often demonized in Russian news for their false advertisement of democracy and 
excessive involvement in the affairs of other nations. Currently, there is a massive wave 
of propaganda bolstering the annexation of Crimea and involvement in eastern Ukraine. 
The fourth component is the manipulation of historical myth and memory as a 
propaganda tool to suit the rhetoric of the current administration.  
 The news that the general Russian public sees is often far from the truth and 
vastly different from what the Western community sees. Russian stations are famous for 
reporting on the superiority of the Russian people and the vast inferiority of the rest of the 
world (Komarnyckyj, 2014, p. 4). Most broadcasts slant in hard favor of Russian foreign 
policy decisions. As a result, Putin has no trouble garnering the support for his actions in 
Ukraine and abroad. On the contrary, Kremlin-run stations have a knack for reprimanding 
the foreign policy decisions of major players in the West. These channels often target the 
U.S. in a negative light, questioning the motives of American leadership domestically and 
abroad. The Kremlin maintains that the U.S. has a false sense of democracy that it 
imposes on the rest of the globe. According to Putin, the European Union is just a weak 
follower of the hegemonic U.S. He suggests it is the United States that the international 
community should fear instead of Russia.  
 In particular regard to the crisis in Ukraine, Putin has cleverly used the media to 
significantly divert the Russian audience from factual evidence of what is transpiring on 
the ground. The propaganda attack is two-fold. The first element is to boost the need and 
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valiance of Russian involvement in the region. This includes bolstering the actions of 
Russia in their humanitarian rescue of struggling ethnic kin (The Public Diplomat, 2014, 
p. 1). News stations show a constant stream of destroyed Ukrainian villages, frozen towns 
with no electricity, and passionate Ukrainians seeking solace in the aid of Russia (BBC 
Monitor, 2016). Putin is presented as a savior who provides the promise of a better life 
and future in the face of a weakened Ukrainian government. As an example, Russian 
media reported a story on Ukrainian nationals who crucified a young boy in front of his 
mother, who was also later killed. They also included a tearful witness. Both the killings 
and the witness story were proven false (Kavadze, 2015, p. 1).  
 The second component of this propaganda attack is portraying western-leaning 
Ukrainians as vicious, merciless fascists. The new President, Petro Poroshenko, has been 
labeled a Nazi on various occasions by Putin’s leadership (Kanet & Sussex, 2015, p. 56). 
The rest of the Ukrainian public, those fighting for a Russia-free Ukraine, are pegged as 
“banderivtsi.” Meant to be derogatory, this taunt is borne of a controversial historical 
figure in Ukraine named Stepan Bandera. As a member of UPA, the Ukrainian insurgent 
army, his role in Ukrainian national interest has been disputed. This term accuses 
Ukrainians west of Donbas of being fascist and ultranationalists (Riabchuk, 2015, p. 5). 
Fabricated news coverage of rallies being manipulated or taken out of context has 
severely escalated this stereotype. This tactic is meant to show the Russian people that his 
help is desperately needed in saving Russians in Ukraine from lawless fascists who 
destroy government buildings and precious monuments (Heritage, 2013, p. 2). The 
media, unsurprisingly, fails to recognize the Russian “volunteers” that are instrumental in 
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fabricating such images of Ukrainian delinquency. VICE news (2015) has documented 
several cases of fabricated uprisings, violence and diversion of attention from true events.   
 The final aspect in the Putin propaganda machine is manipulating the historical 
memory of the nation. Whether it is the origins of Russia and Ukraine, the ownership of 
disputed regions, or the Russian historical myth of Kievan Rus and Crimea, he has been 
able to instill deep signifiers through each element of the Crisis. Even Russian history 
textbooks utilized in schools present a vastly different history than what is recognized in 
Ukraine and the West (Sherlock, 2016, p. 9). For example, the Holodomor, a man-made 
famine that killed millions of Ukrainians by the order of Stalin, is hardly recognized in 
historical literature (Khapaeva, 2016, p. 6-8). This, along with several other ‘outtakes’, is 
teaching children a constructed Russian history, essentially preparing them to seamlessly 
integrate into the propaganda driven society (Pg. 6). In sum, a look into Russia’s current 
propaganda machine highlights key frames that Putin has used to justify the current crisis 
in Ukraine.  
 
Frames in the Literature 
 
Kin-State Rallying 
 
By definition, a kin-state is a state that claims to act on behalf of its co-ethnics 
abroad (Turner & Otsuki, 2010). Used by various leaders throughout history, it was the 
excuse made by Hitler to enter the Sudetenland and protect German ethnic kin. Putin 
utilized the same rationale in the Russo-Georgian war of 2008 and in the current Crisis in 
Ukraine. In Georgia, Putin stepped in on behalf of Russian separatists in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, vying to break away from the Georgian government. In this case, the 
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republics achieved autonomy with the help of Russian might (Tsygankov, 2015, p. 293). 
Essentially, this was a precursor for similar events in eastern Ukraine.  
Thus, one of Putin’s primary justifications for involvement in Ukraine has been 
the notion of kin-state rallying. Dating back to the Compatriot Policy, solidified in 1999, 
supporting ethnic compatriots outside of Russia has been integral component to Russian 
Foreign Policy (Zakem, et al., 2015, pp. 18-20). The policy has since evolved, blurring 
the term co-ethnic into the broader compatriot. Minister Sergei Lavrov stated last year: 
‘Rendering comprehensive support to the Russian World is an unconditional foreign 
policy priority for Russia … we will keep enthusiastically defending the rights of 
compatriots, using for that the entire arsenal of available means envisioned by 
international law (Kuzio, 2015, p. 1).’ The Putin administration has also noted that 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia has seen many of its people separated 
by newfound foreign borders (Bowen & Galeotti, 2014, p. 5). This dissolution of the 
Russian nation deems it necessary for the Kremlin to protect its ethnic kin who are no 
longer a part of Russia.  
 The concentrations of ethnic Russians in various post-Soviet states has given 
Putin an excuse to maintain influence in the region. As Blank (2015) writes, “…Moscow 
subsidizes and otherwise supports a large number of organizations and movements inside 
all of its neighbors, from Kazakhstan to the Baltic, to ensure that the pot is kept boiling 
over the issue of the purported discrimination against these minority Russian 
communities and the Russian diaspora (Blank, 2015).” This kin-state rallying allows 
Putin to continually justify his underhanded influence in the post-Soviet sphere. Ukraine 
is a particular case in that it houses a massive population of ethnic Russians, in addition 
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to sharing a border with Russia itself (Kuzio, 2015, p. 7). Putin states that there are 
approximately seventeen million Russians living in Ukraine, comprising about a third of 
the population. The largest Russian populations are on the southern and eastern borders 
of Ukraine. To this point, Putin asserts that with such a substantial population of Russians 
living in Ukraine, it is necessary to have interests there (Putin, 2008, p.1).  
 Moreover, kin-state nationalism holds a similar premise to the notion of Pan 
Slavism and Ruskii Mir (Russian World) (Kuzio, 2014, p. 4). In countless instances, 
Putin and his various staff members have asserted that Ukrainians, Russians and 
Belarusians are one people: borne of the same Slavic roots (Goble, 2015, p. 1). In 
particular, Putin claims that Ukrainians and Russians both emerge of the Kievan Rus. The 
two nations are bound together by religious, ethnic, historic and linguistic ties. Congruent 
to historical rhetoric, Putin has stated on more than one occasion that Ukraine is a 
territory. Borders cannot separate Russia and Ukraine because they comprise one people 
(Riabchuk, 2012, p. 284). Thus, Putin is able to rationalize his immense influence in 
Ukraine by inferring unity, oneness, a connection of the Slavic people that super-cedes 
borders.  
Kin-state rallying and pan-Slavism are two concepts embedded in Russian 
history. As Blank points out, “Although these tactics emerged most violently in Ukraine, 
their origin goes back at least to Peter the Great, who legitimized his military campaigns 
against the Ottomans by claiming Russia was protecting the Orthodox subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire from discrimination. Such methods have continued to the present day 
(Blank, 2015).” The notion of Ruskii Mir, an organization launched in 2007 to promote 
Russian culture abroad is a modern continuation of this historic precedent. Large sums of 
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money have been allotted to the progress of Ruskii Mir, with factions operating in 
Ukraine (Kuzio, 2015, p.4). The notion that Russians abroad require Putin’s protection 
has substantiated Putin’s various incursions into Post-Soviet territories. 
 
Encirclement by Enemies and Isolation 
 
Another frame of justification derived from the literature is the notion that Russia 
has been a constant victim to isolation and encirclement by its enemies. Liah Greenfeld 
and Daniel Chirot’s (1994) combined study on nationalism and aggression (also the title 
of the work, brings up two key findings that resonate with the current aggressive tactics 
of Russian foreign policy in Ukraine. First, is the notion that collectivist nationalism, as 
opposed to individualist nationalism, is more conducive to aggression and brutality—
designating a clear distinction of “us” versus “them.” (p. 86) Second, the authors suggest 
that a Russian history of encirclement and isolation has instilled a sense of victimhood in 
the Russian people. They are the perpetual victims, never the aggressors (Leon, 2015, p. 
2). This research frames Putin’s current incursion into Ukraine as a product of collectivist 
nationalism and a result of the sentiment of victimhood and perpetual isolation.  
 The work of Greenfeld and Chirot (1994) seamlessly integrates into Putin’s 
current framing of the conflict in Ukraine. Their research suggests that unlike 
individualistic nationalisms that are fueled by upwardly mobile groups, collectivist 
nationalisms are driven by small, “status-anxious” elites that either wish to protect their 
threatened status, or to improve it. These elites unite ethnically, religiously and 
linguistically diverse people under one “nation”, diverting their complaints to external 
factors and essentially “uniting in common hatred (pg. 87).” Uniting a diverse nation 
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against the threat of the “other” is a clear tactic in Putin’s rhetoric. Putin is engaged in 
defensive foreign policy, fending off constant enemies (Leon, 2015, p. 2). 
 To the same effect, Greenfeld and Chirot (1994) present a case study on the 
identification of Russian nationalism growth of anti-Westernism and isolation. In the 
cultural revelry and flourish of society marked by the reigns of both Peter the Great and 
Catherine emerged the sense of community and anti-western sentiment (p. 93). 
Dissatisfaction with the highly valueless and individualistic society of the West led to the 
Russian notion of community under one leader – essentially the birth of authoritarianism. 
Russian nationalism further developed in a sense of Russia’s unique mission and a hatred 
of the West (Pg. 94). A time of growth and advancement resulted in a threatening 
Russian power. When Russia won wars won it proved this power, when it lost it 
solidified the notion that enemies surrounded Russia. Russia’s aggressions within the 
realm of its empire solidified this sentiment (Pg. 96). Once it became clear that nations 
could plot against a threat such as Russia, its foreign policy went on the defensive, 
justifying mass deportations, famines and oppression as “noble duty” to protect their 
people (pg. 97).  
The psychological approaches, stemmed from Tajfel and Turner’s Social Identity 
Theory, emphasize the relevance of categorization, social identification and social 
comparison as an explanation to conflict (Horowitz, 1984). The basis of the 
psychological approach is the need to belong and the establishment of an “us” versus 
“them” mentality. Once Putin accentuated the differences among the Ukrainian people, 
this very notion of “us” versus “them” became a very real phenomenon. Belonging to a 
particular group became relevant, and as the theory states, positive aspects of the in-
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group and negative aspects of the out-group were vastly exaggerated (Korostelina, 2010, 
p. 130).  Further, Ukrainians and Russians living in Ukraine, who once lived peacefully 
as neighbors, rapidly began to categorize one another. Language, regional affiliation and 
nationalistic associations that were once fluid throughout the nation turned into relevant 
labels and stereotypes. By illuminating these variances among the population, and 
providing an undercurrent of military pressure, Putin effectively fashioned a highly 
divided Ukrainian society, in a time of rebirth for the Ukrainian national identity.   
 
Russian Greatness and Ethnocentrism 
 
 Similarly, Russian ethnocentrism, the unmasked superiority and greatness of the 
Russian people, is the backbone to the Russian military incursion in Ukraine. In 2014, 
Andrew Bowen and Mark Galeotti (2014) describe Putin as a self-titled ‘savior of 
Russian culture.’ The authors suggest that although Putin recognizes that the fall of the 
Soviet Union was the biggest disaster of the 20th century, he realizes that he cannot 
reconstruct it. They continue, “Perhaps the best metaphor is that while he brought back 
the Soviet national anthem, it had new words” (p. 1). Subsequently, Bowen and Galeotti 
claim that Putin’s ambitions lie in reviving Russian culture and civilization, restoring the 
patriotism and pride of the Russian people (p. 2). Putin’s actions are a result of his belief 
that Russians are an exceptional people, that there is something unique in the history and 
culture of the Russian people that needs to be protected (Lanoszka, 2016, p. 6).  
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Legal Rhetoric  
 
A fascinating perspective on how Putin was able to justify his aggression in 
Ukraine is Roy Allison’s (2014) look into Putin’s legal rhetoric (p. 1). Allison suggests 
that to maintain his image of a “lawful actor,” Putin masked his war-games in legal 
rhetoric. To support his annexation of Crimea, Putin toyed with the legal basis for 
military intervention and the concept of self-determination. International is often widely 
open to interpretation, and Putin utilized this to his benefit (Pg. 4). Allison claims that 
Putin’s use of cloudy legal rhetoric and his disregard of international law have filled the 
global community with an air of uncertainty and hesitation. According to Allison, Putin 
engaged in ‘deniable intervention,’ essentially exploiting the pitfalls in the legal system 
and blending both legal and illegal actions. This makes it particularly difficult for the 
international community to gage an appropriate response. Further, Allison states that 
Putin legitimized his actions by claiming “to be protecting Russian citizens from 
danger…to be intervening by invitation…and to reference western focus on human 
protection and Kosovo’s secession from Serbia (Allison, 2014, p. 6).” In clouding the 
legal rhetoric, Putin was able to resist more significant repercussions.  
 
Historical Memory and National Myth  
 
Further, Putin has been able to play up the ethos of historical myth. The 
annexation of Crimea was a direct example of this. Rather than admitting that Crimea has 
been a part of Ukraine for the last several decades, Putin focused on the notion of the 
deep historical connection that Russia had to Crimea (Makarychev, 2014, p. 197). Upon 
annexation Putin remarked, “ …after a long, difficult, exhausting voyage, Crimea and 
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Sevastopol are returning to their native harbor, to their native shores, to their point of 
permanent registration— to Russia (Bowen & Galeotti, 2014, p. 4).” This scenario is 
reminiscent of Kosovo and its bid to become an independent nation. While the Kosovars 
are an identifiably different people, Serbian leaders suggested that Kosovo had deep 
historical significance to Serbia and was the birthplace of Serbian martyrdom (Interfax, 
Russia, 2016, p.1). This same situation has played out in Crimea with Putin pulling at the 
heartstrings of the Russian people. In essence, he has created a sense of Russian 
attachment to Crimea in order to justify the illegitimate and expedient annexation 
(Bebler, 2015, p. 11). 
Putin’s primary tactic in effectively dividing the population along ethnic lines was 
the use of historical myths. By giving labels to the west and east that were remnant of 
prominent historical figures, he was able to mobilize emotions, sentiments, and 
stereotypes that were associated with these figures and their ancestry. A historical myth is 
a powerful tool (Sherlock, 2016, p. 3). Since the myth has little to do with true historical 
accuracy, its reiteration lies in the eye of the beholder. In this way, historical myths are 
easy manipulated to shift history in the way that they desire. By linking ethnic groups to 
the stories of their past, they tend to revive and bring purpose to their identities (Wilson, 
1995). With this hidden weapon, Putin was able to make the greatest impact. With the 
preexistent belief that western Ukrainians were nationalistic, Putin pegged the westerners 
as Banderivtsi: a term reminiscent of prominent Ukrainian nationalist and independence 
movement leader, Stepan Bandera (Riabchuk, 2015, p. 5). As predicted, those in the east 
began to categorize based on this stereotype. Along with the geographically defined west, 
those who spoke Ukrainian even to the east of Kiev also became defined under that label. 
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The east was subsequently defined by their call back to a Soviet system and was 
perceived with animosity by the rest of Ukraine. At this point, Donbas and its unique way 
of life became more isolated than ever. 
 Lilia Shevstova (2015) suggests that Putin is at a crossroads. He cannot liberalize 
his system as the risk of losing control, yet he cannot further militarize his country a-la 
Stalin as Russian elites will not allow it. Thus, Shevtsova warns that calm on the surface 
should not be misinterpreted. In the wake of sanctions and resources being directed to the 
Crisis, the economy and system of control in Russia are deteriorating (Luxmoore, 2014, 
p. 4). Additionally, people have no outlets to relieve their anger, signaling that domestic 
tension will only grow from here (Shevstova, 2015). Shevtsova writes in regard to 
Russia, “It will go abroad not to learn the ways of modernization, but to challenge its 
external enemies. As it internationalizes its quest for survival, in other words, the Russian 
system will turn its own degradation into a global problem.” Shevtsova’s argument 
frames Putin’s incursion into Ukraine as a sign of internal decay and instability: 
weakness and sanctions fuel the fire for aggression (Tsygankov, 2015, p. 299).  
 The literature presented identifies several suggested frames that Putin utilizes to 
justify his involvement in Ukraine. The following research will explore the validity of 
these frames in Putin’s own rhetoric on the topic. Through this, the study will also 
examine the significance and implications of framing by elites in the political sphere.  
 
Methodology 
 
 In order to identify frames within Putin’s rhetoric, I utilized qualitative content 
analysis. Krippendorff (2004), a primary expert on the topic, defines content analysis as 
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“a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other 
meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use (Pg. 18)”. Krippendorff highlights the 
significance of replicable results and validity in content analysis. To achieve such results 
in the research requires a systematic and objective approach in which the content is 
handled without the bias of the reader (Pg. 19). Appendix I consists of the limitations and 
tactics I employed in order to achieve objectivity and replicability in the study.  
 This study explores the rhetoric of Vladimir Putin on the Crisis in Ukraine, 
through a content analysis of 57 speeches, excerpts, and interviews made by Putin to both 
a domestic and international audience. The purpose of the study is to identify key 
justifications, or frames, in Putin’s rhetoric and to compare these results with the key 
frames that are identified in the existing literature. In this way, the findings of this study 
can shed light on the ongoing debate over Putin’s motivations in Ukraine.  
 The 57 sources utilized in the study are a nearly exhaustive list of Putin’s rhetoric 
on the Crisis in Ukraine from 2013-2016. I used several criteria to determine which 
sources were relevant to the study.  
1. The first criterion is subject matter. All of the speeches, interviews, and 
excerpts analyzed for this study focus on the Crisis in Ukraine. This includes 
Putin’s rhetoric on Euromaidan, the overthrow of Yanukovich, the annexation 
of Crimea, the Minsk Agreements, and the current scope of Russian foreign 
policy toward Ukraine.  
2. The second criterion is the date of the source. The study focuses on the time 
period beginning with the Maidan uprising and extending into the current 
fighting in Donbas. The dates of the sources, thus, range from 2013 to 2016. 
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Two additional sources were included in the study from 2007 and 2012. Both 
sources are prominent addresses that Putin gave, and are directly related to 
Russian foreign policy toward Ukraine. 
3. The third criterion is indeed Putin’s rhetoric. All of the sources utilized 
contain Putin’s own speech acts. The majority, 47 out of 57 sources, are direct 
transcripts of speeches and interviews given by Putin. The remaining 10 
sources are remarks or excerpts from various news sources that contain 
Putin’s rhetoric on the subject. The excerpts contain quotes given by Putin on 
the topic.  
4. The fourth criterion is credible and varied sources. The sources are a 
combination of official Kremlin releases and prominent international news 
stations. The primary sources utilized were the Kremlin’s official transcripts 
of interviews and press releases. Further, I utilized transcripts of prominent 
speeches that Putin gave to the UN, the Valdai Club, Russian Public, and 
Crimea, among others. Primary interviews included Putin’s discussion with 
Charlie Rose, Bild Newspaper in Germany, and the Italian journal, “Corriere”. 
 
 The focus of this study is to better understand the justifications of Russia’s 
incursion into Ukraine through Putin’s direct rhetoric. To do so, I first conducted several 
preliminary readings of the sources. The first read-through was meant to solidify that the 
source adhered to the aforementioned criteria. Once this was established, I read through 
the sources two more times to get a sense of emerging trends in the rhetoric. In the 
subsequent read through, I was able to identify 8 distinct trends, or justifications, by 
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denoting key phrases that were given in his rhetoric. I coded the sources manually by 
identifying key phrasing pertinent to each category, which will be defined in the findings 
in further detail. The 8 categories that emerged from the research are 1. Protecting 
Ukrainians and Russians/Illegitimate coup/Brother nation, 2. Projecting blame/Lack of 
dialogue, 3. Will of people/Kosovo precedent/Historical memory, 4. Protecting Russian 
interests, 5. Denial of intervention, 6. Minsk unfulfilled, 7. NATO Expansion.  
 Once distinct categories were clear, I organized them into a basic chart. Columns 
were distinguished by category, and rows were distinguished by source (sources were 
organized by date). Next, I went through each source and marked an “X” in the column 
that corresponded to the category utilized. Nearly all sources contained more that one 
“X” in the row, as most sources mentioned more than one justification.  Table 1 and 
Chart 1 show the total frequency that each category (justification) was mentioned within 
the sources.  
 After compiling one comprehensive chart of all the sources, I engaged in a 
subsequent analysis. To identify changes in Putin’s rhetoric throughout the course of the 
Conflict, I created a chart that organized his justifications by year. Since the conflict was 
only beginning in 2013, I utilized 2014, 2015, and 2016 as the focal points. Appendix II 
contains a detailed chart of all 57 sources analyzed in the study. Each entry, organized by 
date, consists of a title, distinction of audience, the source it was taken from, and a small 
description.  
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Findings  
 
 Provided below is an outline of the eight most common trends (justifications) 
found in the rhetoric in order of frequency:  
 
1. Protecting Ukrainians and Russians/Illegitimate coup/Brother nation 
In Putin’s rhetoric this justification was used most frequently: in 32 out of 57 
sources. In the rhetoric, these three categories were integrated into one main justification, 
suggesting that Putin had to help the Ukrainian people, a brother nation, from the new 
illegitimate government. The key phrases used to identify this trend were “helping the 
Ukrainian people,” “brother or sister nation,” and “illegitimate overthrow.” Any form of 
these key phrases provided a check mark in this column. The rhetoric, thus, suggests that 
Putin’s main justification has been to help his brother nation through the chaos that has 
been created by the illegitimate overthrow of Yanukovich.  
The following is an example excerpt taken from Putin’s answers to journalist’s 
questions in Novo-Ogaryovo on March 4, 2014. Following a comment on the overthrow 
in Kiev, Putin states, “When we see this we understand what worries the citizens of 
Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian, and the Russian-speaking population in the eastern 
and southern regions of Ukraine. It is the uncontrolled crime that worries them. 
Therefore, if we see such crime spreading to the eastern regions of the country, and if the 
people ask us for help while we already have the official request from the legitimate 
president, we retain the right to use all available means to protect those people” (Putin, 
March 4th 2014, p. 6). Later on he notes, “I want you to understand me clearly; if we 
make that decision, it will only be to protect Ukrainian citizens” (p. 12).  
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2. Projecting Blame/Lack of dialogue 
 The trend of projecting blame along with a lack of engagement in dialogue is a 
close second with a frequency of 31 out of 57 sources. In this trend, Putin often projects 
blame on the West, stating that they funded the Crisis in Ukraine, and continue in 
extensive involvement as a tactic to draw Russia into further isolation. Subcategories that 
are used in tandem with this trend are a lack of dialogue between the West, Ukraine, and 
Russia in the conflict, as well as, critique of American democracy promotion and its 
volume of troops stationed on foreign borders. The key phrases utilized were “U.S. 
supported the coup,” comparison of Russian to U.S. troops, “Russia is open for 
dialogue”, “Ukraine must lead negotiations,” and similar combinations. 
 An example of such rhetoric is presented in an excerpt from one of Putin’s 
answers in a Q&A session with journalists. Putin states, “And it is not the first time our 
Western partners are doing this in Ukraine. I sometimes get the feeling that somewhere 
across that huge puddle, in America, people sit in a lab and conduct experiments, as if 
with rats, without actually understanding the consequences of what they are doing (Putin, 
March 4th 2014, p. 15).” In addition, claims about Putin’s military involvement in 
Ukraine are often met with a retort on the quantity of troops that the U.S. has on foreign 
borders and the forced promotion of American values onto nations who are unready and 
unwilling. When directly questioned on his aggression in Ukraine, Putin projects the 
blame off of himself and onto other parties.  
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3. Will of the people/Kosovo precedent/Historical memory of Russia 
 This trend of three interwoven factors was utilized by Putin in 22 out of 57 
sources. Often used in tandem, the gist of this combined justification is that Crimea is an 
integral part of Russian historical myth, the people of Crimea chose in the referendum to 
be a part of Russia, and the precedent of Kosovo gives this notion legitimacy. Putin 
essentially asserts that it is unjust to counter the overwhelming will of the people. Seeing 
as Crimea was historically and ethnically an integral part of Russia, it is only natural that 
it be returned to Russia unharmed. Putin mentions the Kosovo precedent as an example 
of the power in the will of the people. The coding for this category consisted of phrases 
such as “will of the people”, “Kosovo precedent”, “right to determine their future”, 
“historical memory”, and the like.  
 For example, Putin spoke on this topic in a speech to Federation council 
members, deputies of the Duma, Russian citizens, and representatives from Crimea and 
Sevastopol on March 18th, 2014. He stated, “…the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol 
turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives, in preventing the events that 
were unfolding and are still underway in Kiev, Donetsk, Kharkov, and other Ukrainian 
cities. Naturally, we could not leave the plea unheeded; we could not abandon Crimea 
and its residents in distress. This would have been betrayal on our part” (p. 5). In regard 
to historical memory, Putin writes, “Time and time again attempts were made to deprive 
Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to forced 
assimilation” (p. 4). 
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4. Protection of Russians Abroad- Ethnic Kin  
 Putin notes the justification of protecting Russians abroad 21 times throughout the 
rhetoric. This trend highlights aspects of Russian pride, patriotism in the Russian nation, 
and the adamant protection of Russian co-ethnics abroad. To this effect, Putin often states 
these justifications in relation to the separation of Russian people by borders after the fall 
of the Soviet Union. He asserts that he must protect the rights of all Russians living 
abroad, rights that were being discriminated against in Ukraine. Putin states that the 
situation in Ukraine reached a point that his leadership could no longer tolerate. The 
coding for this justification included “Russian pride”, “protection of Russians abroad”, 
“Russian values”, “rights of Russian speakers”, and the like.  
 In December of 2013, Putin gave an address to the Russian people in which he 
stated, “We are aware of the all-encompassing, unifying role of the Russian culture, 
history and language for our multi-ethnic population and we must build our state policy 
with this in mind” (p. 4). In his remarks to the Duma in March 2014, Putin also states, 
“Millions of Russians and Russian speaking people live in Ukraine and will continue to 
do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, diplomatic and legal 
means. But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own interests to ensure that these people’s 
rights and interests are fully protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine’s state stability 
and territorial integrity” (p. 10). 
 
5. Russian denial of involvement  
 The denial of Russian military involvement in Ukraine is a trend that surfaces in 
18 sources throughout the rhetoric. Coding for this trend included “no intention of 
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involvement”, “no armed forces”, “peace for Ukraine” and similar phrases. This 
justification is particularly fascinating as there is palatable evidence of Russian 
intervention into Ukraine. Nonetheless, Putin attests that he is hoping for a peaceful 
resolution and that the Russian Federation has no intention of intervening in the 
neighboring country. To this effect, Putin adds Ukraine is more than capable of settling 
this Crisis on its own and does not require Russia to step in.  
 In a Russia-EU Summit held in Brussels on January 28th, 2014 Putin states, “as 
for advice for Ukraine on what to do and how to do it, I think the Ukrainian people are 
quite capable of deciding this for themselves. In any case, Russia has no intention of ever 
intervening” (p. 7). In response to a question on the possibility of war breaking out in 
Ukraine Putin states, “I am not concerned, because we do not plan and we will not fight 
with the Ukrainian people” (p. 12). This is one of several almost identical remarks in 
which Putin denies any interest or plans to engage in a war with Ukraine.  
 
6. Legal Rhetoric  
 The sixth most prominent justification that Putin utilizes in his rhetoric is that his 
foreign policy is always conducted within the bounds of international law. Thus, his 
involvement in Ukraine and his annexation of Crimea were both legal and justified. The 
use of legal rhetoric appears 16 times within the sources. In a majority of the examples, 
Putin states that Russia strives to consistently comply with international law. At points, 
this claim is substantiated by a comparison of Russian versus U.S. accordance to 
international laws and norms.  
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 In an interview with Hubert Seipel on Novemeber 27th, 2014, Putin states, “We 
believe that this sort of reaction was totally disproportionate to what had happened. 
Whenever I hear complaints about Russia violating international law I am simply 
amazed. What is international law? It is first of all the United Nations Charter, 
international practice and its interpretation by relevant international institutions” (Global 
Research, 2014, p. 3). In regard to the comparison of abiding to international norms with 
the West Putin states, “…what do we hear from our colleagues in Western Europe and 
North America? They say we are violating norms of international law. Firstly, it’s a good 
thing that they at least remember there exists such a thing as international law—better 
late than never” (Putin, 2014, p. 5). 
 
7. Minsk Agreements Unfulfilled 
 Also used 16 times is the justification that Putin’s involvement is required in 
order to fulfill the Minsk agreements. Putin claims that it is only through his involvement 
that there was any headway made in the attempted ceasefire. Putin claims that he is 
waiting on the cooperation of Ukraine to fulfill the agreement. On the other hand, 
Poroshenko maintains that it is unsafe to lay down arms at this time as there is heavy 
artillery consistently coming from the separatists. The coding for this justification 
included “Minsk agreement”, “Russian cooperation on ceasefire”, “lack of Ukrainian 
response”, and so on.  
 In an interview with Hubert Seipel, Putin states, “the Minsk agreements arose 
only because Russia became actively involved in the effort; we worked with the Donbas 
militias, that is the fighters from southeast Ukraine, and we convinced them that they 
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should settle for certain agreements. If we had not done that, it would simply not have 
happened. There are some problems with the implementation of these agreements, it is 
true” (Global Research, 2014, p. 4). This claim exemplifies Putin’s perceived role in the 
Agreements.  
 
8. NATO Expansion 
 The final category, mentioned 10 times in the rhetoric, is the justification of 
countering the threat to NATO expansion. Putin talks of the threat that NATO presents if 
it continues an eastward expansion right on to Russia’s borders. This would not only 
threaten the security of Russia, but it would directly contradict the warnings given to 
NATO to stay out of Georgia and Ukraine. Talks of Kiev joining NATO are also cause 
for concern to the relationship between Ukraine and Russia (Putin, 2014, p. 10).  
 In February 2007, Putin spoke at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy. 
In regard to NATO he stated, “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have 
any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in 
Europe. On the contrary it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of 
mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: Against whom is this expansion intended (p. 
5).” This speech given in 2007 is an example of the continued stance that Russia has on 
the threat of NATO expansion. Coding for this included “NATO expansion”, “eastward 
encroachment”, and “frontline on Russian borders.”  
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Trends by Year 
 In order to gage whether Putin’s rhetoric changed throughout the progression of 
the conflict, essentially form Maidan to Crimea to Donbas, the sources were grouped by 
year. Only the most relevant years of 2014, 2015 and 2016 were chosen as they pertain to 
the events of interest. Since there was an unequal distribution of sources among these 
years, it was difficult to assess any major shifts in rhetoric throughout the conflict. 
However, what this analysis did show is that 2015 was a major turning block in the 
conflict, and it was a year that fostered increased media attention and debate. It is also 
evident that in 2015, Putin gave significant attention to the Crisis in Ukraine, along with 
other world leaders. In the start of 2016, attention has dwindled from Ukraine and 
progressed to other issues such as the civil war in Syria and the rise of ISIS (Stent, 2016 
Pg. 6). Whether it was a strategic move by Putin, or simply the nature of media coverage, 
attention on the Crisis in Ukraine began to fade in 2016.  
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Table 1- Putin’s Frames and Frequencies in the Ukraine Crisis  
Putin’s Frames Frequency  
Helping Ukrainians/brother 
nation/illegitimate coup 
32/57 
Projecting blame/lack of dialogue 31/57 
Will of people/Kosovo 
precedent/historical memory 
22/57 
Protecting Russian interests 21/57 
Denial of intervention 18/57 
Legal Rhetoric  16/57 
Minsk Unfulfilled  16/57 
NATO expansion 10/57 
 
 
Chart 1- Comparison of Total Frequencies  
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A Comparison of the Findings to Existing Studies  
 
 As Druckman notes, “Indeed frame strength goes a long way in determining who 
wins or loses in politics” (2009, p. 29). This conclusion, derived from James Druckman’s 
research on the influence of framing in politics, gives particular salience to Putin’s 
intense use of propaganda and manipulation to present the conflict in Ukraine through 
specific frames. With a monopoly on media (Lynch, 2015, p. 7) and celebrity status 
among the people (Sperling, 2015, p. 2), Putin’s rhetoric, and only his rhetoric, is heard. 
In this, Putin has the ability to guide public opinion on the conflict in Ukraine and his 
involvement there. So, how is he justifying his actions? The answer is simple. Putin is 
justifying Russia’s actions in Ukraine by framing his involvement there as legitimate, 
benevolent and necessary.  
 The strategic use of framing is an influential tool in politics. It gives elites the 
unique opportunity to steer the masses toward a desired outcome. By presenting 
information through a particular lens, elites can virtually construct a problem and provide 
a solution for it (Druckman, 2009, p. 18). In the Russian nation for example, such a 
problem is often externalized, meant to rile up domestic support and demonize the 
proposed enemy (Shevtsova, 2015). Returning to Druckman (2009), there is a fascinating 
interaction among political elites vying for ample airtime. They are aware that the more 
coverage they receive, the easier it will be to promulgate their ideas to the public (p. 23). 
This competition for media attention solidifies the utility and strength that framing 
possesses in international politics.  
This particular case strongly exemplifies the significance of framing in achieving 
desired outcomes as it demonstrates how an act of aggression can be manipulated in the 
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international and domestic sphere to resemble something different. Putin’s use of 
propaganda is a key tactic in influencing particularly domestic public opinion on the 
conflict. The framing of his rhetoric resonates with the masses, providing even greater 
approval for the already celebrated leader (Levada Center Poll, 2016). As Putin holds a 
monopoly over practically all Russian media sources, we can infer that the propaganda 
that is circulated is in direct order from the Kremlin.  
Looking back to the findings, Putin’s justifications point to the use of several 
relevant frames in his rhetoric. Most prominent is Putin’s ability to frame his actions in 
Ukraine as necessary and benevolent. As the rhetoric suggests, Putin’s main justification 
for involvement in Ukraine is the obligation to act on behalf of the embattled Ukrainians 
who are toiling under the strain of the new, illegitimate government. Putin labels not only 
his ethnic kin, but also all Ukrainians, as one people with Russia. Time and again he 
laments the struggle of Ukrainians living under constant corruption and governmental 
instability (Putin, March 18th 2014). Accordingly, Putin’s rhetoric presents a clear sense 
of disapproval for and lack of legitimacy in the new leadership. Consistent rhetoric of this 
kind emboldens the point that Russia’s closest relatives are in need of help. Framing the 
situation in this way presents Putin’s involvement in Ukraine as a necessary measure.  
In direct relation to necessity is the notion of Putin acting out of benevolence to 
his brother nation. Putin often sympathizes with the Ukrainians, expressing that it pains 
him to see such civil unrest and devastation so close to home (Putin interview, Mar. 18 
2014, p.10). Hence, he often places himself in the position of a concerned observer. More 
often than not, Putin speaks of his desire for peaceful resolution in Ukraine and insists on 
his willingness to engage in open dialogue with all parties involved. Supported by his 
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denial of troops on the ground, Putin is able to sell his involvement in Ukraine as purely 
diplomatic: seeking a peaceful resolution for his Slavic brothers.  
Upon taking a closer look, however, there is a commonality of contradictions that 
emerges throughout his rhetoric. While much of Putin’s rhetoric focuses on helping the 
Ukrainian people, his characterization of them fluctuates from brothers to enemies and 
fascists. This discrepancy is evident throughout the conflict and creates confusion on 
Putin’s true perceptions: Perhaps that is the point. While Putin speaks ardently on lending 
a hand to Ukrainians, his propaganda machine circulates images of violent 
ultranationalists staging rallies and destroying cities (Shynkarenko, 2014, p. 2). 
Incidentally, VICE News has reported numerous cases of these seemingly nationalistic 
rallies that turn out to be staged by Russian fighters (Luhn, 2015, p.1).  
Accordingly, another prominent justification that Putin utilizes is protecting his 
ethnic kin from the subjugation and lack of representation they face in Ukraine, coupled 
with the threat of violent fascists (Bebler, 2015, p.8). Putin consistently defends the 
language, culture, and rights of his co-ethnics living outside of Russia’s borders. In 
Ukraine, there were several key moments that Putin highlighted in an effort to necessitate 
his involvement on behalf of these co-ethnics. Through the use of propaganda, Putin 
framed the conflict to appear as if his ethnic kin required immediate protection, and it 
was his duty to provide it for them. To this effect, Putin emphasized the suggestion given 
in Ukrainian government to remove Russian as an official language in Ukraine as a clear 
attack on Russians’ rights (Bebler, 2015, p. 8). Further, the media ran several stories of 
villagers crying out for Putin’s help in both Crimea and the east.  
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In order to provide further legitimacy to his actions, Putin often manipulates the 
notion of national myth and historical memory to provide a story that his audience can 
relate to. It is clear in the rhetoric that Putin often uses this frame in regard to Crimea. 
Reminiscent of the claim on the birth of Serbian martyrdom in Kosovo, Putin often 
stresses the historical Russianness of Crimea and its deep bond with Russian society 
(Bebler, 2015, p. 10). Centering on ethos, Putin emphasizes the illegitimacy with which 
Crimea was initially given to Ukraine, and the desperate will of the people living there to 
return to Russia (Putin, March 18th, 2014, p. 6, 9). Putin has been able to influence the 
social memory of the Russian people and bring a consensus and bastion of support for his 
actions in Ukraine. As Miguel Linan (2010), of the University of Seville puts it, “…this 
period is on the defensive. It is propaganda discourse that rather than shedding light on 
the past, accuses those who question Russia’s greatness of lying” (p. 177).  
 In the justification of projecting blame resonates the framing of Russia as a 
constant victim and bound in isolation. In Putin’s rhetoric, the West is the spark that 
started the Maidan uprising, providing billions of dollars and personnel in order to 
establish a Western leaning government and to further isolate Russia. Putin condemns the  
West for meddling in Ukraine and implies that this is not the first time that the U.S. has 
intervened in Russia’s sphere of influence, and Ukraine is a step too far (Putin, March 4th 
2014, p.15). Further, much of Putin’s propaganda focuses on anti-Western sentiment, 
accusing the U.S. in particular of hating Russia and disrespecting its traditional values 
(Lynch, 2015, p. 1). While this is hardly a reason for invading in a sovereign country, 
Putin maintains that while the U.S. meddles, his assistance is welcomed and necessary.  
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 To the international community, Putin’s aggression in Ukraine is in clear violation 
of several international treaties, laws, and norms (Motyl, 2014, p. 2). Looking at the 
findings, however, suggests a different story. Putin consistently presents himself as 
someone who vehemently abides by the law and encourages others to do the same. 
Further, he often condemns the West for their actions abroad, citing them as illegitimate 
and unbound to international law. His stark defense of the annexation of Crimea as a fully 
justified move and the diplomacy with which he engages in the east, frame his actions in 
the conflict as legally sound and legitimate. While it is evident that Putin’s aggression is a 
violation of international law, exploring his rhetoric makes this a difficult point to argue.  
 The findings suggest that several of the analysts presented earlier are correct in 
identifying the key frames that Putin is using to justify his actions in Ukraine. The first 
are Kuzio and Blank (2015), who suggested that Putin was framing the conflict in the 
context of kin-state rallying; presenting his actions as a measure to save and protect his 
ethnic kin. The findings support this argument, as it turns out to be one of Putin’s main 
justifications. Further, Allison’s take on Putin’s use of blurred legal rhetoric also directly 
coincides with the findings. Allison argues that Putin has framed his actions as a 
legitimate measure, an appropriate and justified response in light of the circumstances. To 
this effect, Allison claims that Putin took advantage of the interpretive and often 
ambiguous nature of international law and molded it to fit his agenda.  
 Also spot on is the work of Greenfeld and Chirot that labels Russia a collectivistic 
society, externalizing their problems and uniting as a nation through common hatred. A 
distinct notion of “us” versus “them” is a common theme in Putin’s rhetoric (Greenfeld 
and Chirot, 1994, p. 86). This also progresses to Russia’s feeling of constant encirclement 
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by enemies and isolation. By projecting blame onto the West in a slew of anti-Western 
propaganda and accusing the United States of hating Russia, Putin solidifies Greenfeld 
and Chirot’s claims. Also, Putin’s use of historical memory to foster a deep connection 
with Crimea and Donbas is reminiscent of the frame suggested by Sherlock. Bebler also 
notes the use of ethos to assert the overwhelming feeling of Russianness present in both 
Crimea and Donbas (2015, p. 10).  
 The literature presented is highly conducive to the findings of this study. A look 
into Putin’s rhetoric has solidified the claims of analysts who suggest that he was framing 
his actions through protection of his ethnic kin, anti-western projection of blame, blurred 
legal rhetoric and manipulation of historical myth and memory. Beyond his use of 
framing, however, it is important to explore the method with which he is able to so 
effectively project these frames onto the general public. Exploring the utility of Putin’s 
propaganda machine in his ability to frame the conflict is paramount in this study.  
 The use of propaganda and disinformation has been an enduring strategy of the 
Kremlin. The highly regulated flow of news and media stories consistently bolster the 
Putin Regime, condemn the West, and more recently display a negative image of the 
Ukrainian people. The question remains, however, as to how Putin is able to so 
effectively sway the public mindset. There are a few potential answers to this. The first is 
the Kremlin’s violent efforts to silence the opposition in Russia. With no one to speak out 
against the regime, Putin can ensure that only his rhetoric is circulated. Further, his 
tendency to externalize Russian problems works to unify the people in support of policies 
that seem to promote the Russian nation. In regard to the situation in Ukraine, Putin was 
able to easily project anti-Ukrainian sentiment on the people of Donbas and provide them 
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with the idea of a better future in Russia. With this he reinvigorated divides among the 
Ukrainian people and necessitated them to choose sides.  
  Prominent opposition against the Russian regime is minimal at best. This is a 
result of several mysterious poisonings and murders of outspoken opposition leaders to 
the Putin Regime. Most notable were the cases of Alexander Litvienko who was poisoned 
in London, and the public murder of Boris Nemtsov on the streets of Moscow (Rainsford, 
2015, p. 8). Nemtsov, an open critic of the Putin Regime, was in the process of 
publishing a book on his perspective of the war in Ukraine before he was killed 
(Rainsford, 2015, p. 6). These mysterious acts, among several other cases, are a massive 
deterrent to others who wish to speak out against the Kremlin. And as Shevtsova writes, 
Russians do not have a place to relieve their anger or malcontent, building tension in the 
domestic sphere (Shevtsova, 2015). Still, Putin receives consistent support by effectively 
externalizing Russia’s domestic problems.   
The theory of social construction consists of elites or ethnic entrepreneurs 
interested in their own material or political gains, who effectively rile up the masses by 
mobilizing identities that deeply resonate with the people and culture. Thus, although 
social constructivists argue that ethnic identities are not biologically given, they assert 
that these elite constructed identities are not based off of nothing. The main undercurrent 
of this theory is that ethnic identities are the products of human actions and choices 
(Horowitz, 1984). This is congruent with Putin’s strategy in Ukraine where he was able 
to bring to the forefront identities that have been present, yet stagnant, for decades. 
 In Ukraine, the manipulation of the separatists was quite simple. As a majority of 
Donbas inhabitants have never left the region, their access to information is narrow and 
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one sided. Consequently, Putin was able to instill the people with various notions about 
Kiev and western Ukraine, all the while projecting the promise of adequate representation 
and improved quality of life that they could have as a part of Russia. To rile up 
resentment against western Ukraine, propaganda filled Donbas with stories of Ukrainian 
fascists who hate the Russian language and the people in the east (Gvosdev, 2015, p. 4). 
On the opposite side, westerners viewed Donbas a broken territory of criminals and 
enemies of Ukraine. Putin was able to capitalize on these pre-existent sentiments and 
frame the conflict around them.  
 The contradiction between Putin’s framing of the conflict and his evident 
aggression in Ukraine has resulted in a series of unprecedented implications. In his effort 
to foster warmer relations and maintain Ukraine’s presence in Russia’s economic arena, 
Putin has essentially lost Ukraine. In addition, he has only strengthened the desire of the 
Ukrainian people to progress in a Western-leaning society (Von Eggert, 2014, p. 3). His 
actions have also led to a weakened domestic economy and society, something that his 
involvement in Ukraine was meant to bolster. Another major implication has been a 
reversion to Cold-War era-like tensions between Russia and the West. These examples 
detail the implications that arose as a result of Putin’s strategic framing of the conflict.  
As western Ukraine toils in fear that it’s neighbor will expand further into their 
territory, anti-Russian sentiments are growing ever stronger both at home, and throughout 
diaspora communities abroad. The identities and divides that Putin reinvigorated were, in 
fact, already underpinned in all three players involved, and their salience only grows with 
each progression of this unprecedented war. The overarching sentiment of the masses, 
thus, continues to be an immediate conclusion to the war and a dis-attachment of further 
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Russian influence. Not only has Putin established resentment toward himself, he has also 
fostered a newfound resentment in Ukrainians for the Russian people: something that 
previously had not existed in significant stature. By fueling this Crisis, Putin has 
effectively promoted a new sense of Ukrainian nationalism and pride in purely Ukrainian 
traditions, language and culture (Goble, 2015, p. 1). Contrary to historical trends, 
Ukrainian is now seen as the preferred language. Thus, although Putin constructed an 
environment for conflict, he gave Ukrainians a purpose and a nation to fight for.  
As Shevtsova writes, the unnecessary war in Ukraine has left Russia economically 
destabilized and socially divided. Frames such as projection of blame and kin-state 
rallying were meant to unify the Russian nation against a common enemy however; 
constant sanctions and subsequent economic downturn have had a destabilizing effect on 
the unity of the Russian people (Shevtsova, 2015). The costly agenda, the murders of 
popular opposition leaders, and disapproval for the war have resulted in several massive 
protests in the major cities of Russia. Unbiased polls also show a drop in approval ratings 
for the direction that the country is headed in. Ironically, Putin consistently maintains 
approval ratings in the range of 70-80% (Levada Center Poll, 2016).  
 In his aggressive bout to keep Ukraine in the regional economic and security 
arena, Putin has not only lost the cooperation of Ukraine, but also that of the West. A 
little over two decades have passed since the end of the Cold War, yet tensions have 
again resurfaced in the midst of this Crisis. Perhaps this tension stems from Tsygankov’s 
(2015) argument of consistent misunderstanding between the two countries. As 
mentioned earlier, Tsygankov suggests that hostilities remain largely due to the 
contradiction between Russian ethnocentrism and the U.S.’s ethno-phobia (p. 287). This 
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is a notion that fosters misunderstanding between the two nations, leaving Russia in a 
constant feeling of isolation from Western affairs and the U.S. apprehensive of a 
potentially imperialistic Russia. In regard to Ukraine, Putin’s framing of the war has 
reasserted this pre-existent mistrust between the two regional hegemons.  
Aside from exemplifying the significance and implications of framing, this study 
also sheds a fascinating light on the debate over Putin’s motivations in Ukraine. If we 
take Putin at face value, and understand his rhetoric as veritable, then we can see from the 
findings that there are clear holes in the well-known debate of Mearsheimer, McFaul and 
Sestanovich (2014). While Putin does speak on the threat of NATO expansion, it is last 
on the list of his justifications. The findings in this study do not support either 
Mearsheimer’s assertion of Russia acting to balance NATO expansion, nor McFaul and 
Sestanovich’s claim that Russia’s aggression is a result of domestic instability (McFaul, 
Mearsheimer, Sestanovich, 2014, p. 1). Moreover, the realist approach, arguing that states 
act to balance security and acquire power (Makarychev, 2014, p. 183), is simply not 
present in the findings. The rhetoric indicates a far more complex story, combining power 
grabbing with deep historical and societal connections.  
Another argument on Putin’s motivations in Ukraine is his desire to restore the 
glory of the Soviet empire. This claim suggests that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine is an 
imperialistic pull to reestablish Russian influence in the region and keep the post-Soviet 
states under the hand of Russian rule (Tsygankov, 2015, p. 294). This is a common 
Western perspective on the topic; however, the findings again do not support this claim. 
While Putin recognizes that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was the biggest tragedy 
of the 20th century, his rhetoric does not suggest a desire to rebuild it. Moreover, while 
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the findings imply that Russia sustains its influence in the region by maintaining Russian 
minority enclaves in almost all post-Soviet states, they do not suggest a desire for a 
resurgence of imperialism within the region.  
One of the key fundamentals of content analysis is that the results of the research 
are replicable and applicable to other cases (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 19). The study is 
applicable to the general public in that it details a case study based around the 
significance and implications of framing used by elites in the political arena. This 
research can relate to a number of similar cases in the region abroad in which elites frame 
conflicts to attain a preferred outcome. Studying the direct rhetoric of leaders can be truly 
telling. We can either take leaders at face value, or recognize the contradictions in their 
rhetoric that point to holes in their strategy. Either way, the use and significance of 
framing in guiding public perception of conflicts is manifested in the rhetoric of political 
elites.  
  
Conclusion 
 
 A costly and damaging war is waging on in the southeastern borders of Ukraine 
and the prospects of a peaceful resolution appear grim. Even if the Ukrainian government 
succeeds in regaining control of the separatist republics, the political climate will remain 
wary leaving no room for missteps and high risk of reversion (Molchanov, 2015, p. 8). 
And although the physical wounds will heal once the weapons are laid down on both 
sides, the emotional scars will leave a lasting impression on all parties involved in the 
crisis. This war happened in a time of rebirth for the Ukrainian nation, and perhaps once 
the tensions ease, Ukraine will finally get a chance to build sustainable nationhood.  
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 A look into the justifications of Putin through his own rhetoric, in light of the 
Crisis in Ukraine, has given particular salience to the significance and implications of 
framing by elites on the international stage. Further, the findings of this study speak to 
the current debate on Putin’s motivations in Ukraine. While the prominent approaches 
currently attest Putin’s actions in Ukraine to a balance to NATO expansion and the result 
of domestic instability, the findings of this study demonstrate minimal support for this 
claim. While Putin does mention NATO expansion as a potential threat, his rhetoric is 
primarily focused on aspects of kin-state protection and the projection of blame onto the 
West as instigators of the conflict.  
 The distinction of various claims and justifications through which Putin framed 
the conflict, not only identified the utility and success of framing, but also pointed out its 
consequences and implications to Putin’s agenda. While Putin was able to effectively 
frame the conflict in Ukraine to appear as a Western promulgated civil war, his tactics 
also manifested several significant consequences. For instance, the solidification of 
identities through mass propaganda initially divided Ukraine into a seemingly bipolar 
arena of nationalists in the west and pro-Russians in the east. However, the Kremlin’s 
inability to legitimize these divisive accusations led to an unprecedented unification of 
the Ukrainian nation and further isolation of Russia from the West.  
Putin’s initial agenda to divide the nation of Ukraine into two opposing poles has 
actually had quite the opposite effect. It is suggested in the rhetoric that Putin predicted a 
highly split Ukrainian nation, and a strengthened Russian nation. In reality, Ukrainians 
have never felt such a strong sense of nationhood. The war, in effect, has fostered a 
newfound desire for a vast majority of Ukrainians to vie for the unity and success of the 
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Ukrainian people (Goble, 2015, p. 1). For instance, Ukrainians who were insulted by the 
derogatory term of ‘banderivtsi’ have now embraced the insult. Rather than symbolizing 
fascism, the term now stands for patriotic Ukrainians who are proud of their nation and 
want to see it independent and flourishing (p. 1-2). This was an unexpected turn of events 
for Putin whose strategy depends heavily on intense propaganda. In return, Russians are 
beginning to retaliate against Putin’s incursion into Ukraine. It turns out that Russia is the 
one fractionalizing under the pressure of foreign advances.  
 While this study applies particularly to the conflict in Ukraine, its basis provides 
salience to a number of other conflicts in the region and abroad. The findings pose a 
necessary look into the significance of framing, suggesting that the rhetoric of elites can 
be very telling in cases of crisis. In this case, an analysis of Putin’s rhetoric pointed out 
key contradictions between his words and his practice. These contradictions point to 
specific holes of Putin’s strategy in Ukraine that can guide future policy toward a 
resolution.   
 In light of the findings in this study, my opinion is that the threat of Putin’s 
regime extends far wider than Donbas and Ukraine. Following suit to similar separatist 
movements in the region, it is evident that the acquisition of Donbas and Crimea is only a 
stepping-stone to subsequent conflicts. Putin’s strategies have been consistent throughout 
the region. The tactic has been to militarily engage in separatist movements on behalf of 
Russian compatriots, and remove them from the control of the presiding government. 
This is evidenced in the cases of Georgia, Moldova and Chechnya, among others. In 
2008, Russian military might successfully backed the Republics of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in their efforts to separate from the Georgian government. Moldova experienced 
  48 
a similar situation with its eastern border region of Transnistria, where Russian troops are 
stationed to this day. Also, Putin transformed the Republic of Chechnya into a military 
state with utmost loyalty to the Kremlin: the result of two brutal wars that left Chechnya 
in shambles and a puppet government in its place (Shuster, 2015, p. 5).  
 Such events are ominous precursors of what is to come in Ukraine should Russia 
gain full control over the Donbas region. The case of Ukraine is unique, however. 
Russia’s insistence that Ukrainians are just an extension of the Russian people adds a 
level of complexity to the already heavily intermingled societies (Molchanov, 2015, p. 3). 
The deep history of Ukrainian subjugation by Russia raises the stakes for Putin’s 
involvement in his neighbor state. At this point, Putin’s economic and social ties to the 
region far outweigh the interest of the West to get involved militarily on Ukraine’s behalf 
(Warner, 2015, p. 4).  
 Further, Ukraine’s fate hinders on its own internal instability. The biggest issue 
that Ukraine currently faces is corruption within its own government. An impending 
fallback into the oligarchical ways of the old regime is sending the public into further 
unrest and confusion. As the web of corruption is gradually exposed, there is grave 
potential for a massive resurgence of protests akin to Euromaidan. This would only 
reawaken frustration among the people and pull the country further into economic 
destabilization. This would have several detrimental repercussions. First, it would only 
enhance the already permissive environment for harboring radical and separatist 
sentiment. Second, it would reinvigorate Putin’s justifications of coming to save the 
people from the incompetent and illegitimate Ukrainian government. And finally, it 
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would deter the flow of Western aid and assistance to the conflict. Thus, the main Crisis 
in Ukraine lies within its own government.  
 It is becoming all the more evident that Putin is on the losing end of the battle in 
Ukraine. The support of his nation is dwindling, and the Ukrainian people have unified 
rather than crumbled in the midst of his invasion (Boyes, 2016, p. 2). As a result, Putin is 
now vying for a frozen conflict, and further, a federalized Ukraine or even a failed state. 
A unified Ukraine under one distinct leadership would be fatal to Putin’s agenda. 
Federalization on the other hand, in which the country would essentially separate and 
divide leadership amongst the regions, would give Putin the upper hand that he desires 
(Eyal, 2015, p. 2). In the case of federalization, Putin would be able to remain an integral 
part of Ukrainians affairs, particularly in the Donbas (Anonymous, 2014, p. 4).  
 In regard to the frozen conflict, many analysts suggest that Putin has been 
strategically diverting attention from the Crisis in Ukraine to the civil war in Syria with 
his airstrike campaign. This theory suggests that Putin is attempting to direct the attention 
of the global community to the conflict in Syria in order to further carry out his agenda in 
Ukraine (Stent, 2016, p. 2). With the attention off of Ukraine, he would be able to fulfill 
his efforts of federalizing the nation and effectively freezing the conflict to a standstill. In 
the event of a frozen conflict, Ukraine would slowly begin to ware and cripple 
economically and politically from the continuing costs of the war (Eyal, 2015, p. 2). This 
would be an ideal situation for Putin, as Ukraine would no longer have the strength or 
resources to fight off his incursion. The international community is, thus, attempting to 
diminish the possibility of an effective standstill in Ukraine (Boyes, 2016, p. 3).  
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 As a result of his foreign philandering, Putin has received a plethora of economic 
sanctions from the international community; although many analysts believe that this is 
not enough to quell his actions. The sanctions have served as a temporary deterrent 
(Ashford, 2016, p. 2). They are slowly wearing away at the economic stability of the 
Russian powerhouse, causing increasing civil unrest. Putin contends that the sanctions are 
effectively hurting the global market, in particular that of the West, rather than proving to 
be detrimental to Russia (“Former Kremlin internal policy chief,” 2015, p. 50). His 
continued denial of invasion, however, is only serving to sustain sanctions against Russia 
and perhaps see increased measures of punishment.  
 The findings of this study pose a unique perspective on Putin’s involvement in 
Ukraine. The most telling justification is Putin’s vehement protection of his ethnic kin 
abroad. This justification is the common link that unifies all of the Kremlin’s previous 
incursions in the region. Blank is correct in stating that with the Kremlin’s stark 
protection of ethnic Russian minorities in the Post-Soviet sphere, Putin is able to keep the 
pot boiling on the basis of Russian minority discrimination in nearly every state in the 
region. Following suit to the cases of Georgia, Moldova, and Chechnya, the case in 
Ukraine is a harbinger for further incursions of this kind (Bebler, 2015, p. 6). In sum, this 
study has presented the implications and significance of Putin’s framing of the conflict in 
Ukraine through mass propaganda and provided the framework for future studies.  
 
“Putin has declared a war of brother against brother in the Ukraine. This bloody folly by 
a crazed KGB man will cost Russia and Ukraine dearly: once again the deaths of young 
boys on both sides, bereft mothers and wives, children turned into orphans. An empty 
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Crimea, which tourists will never visit. Billions, tens of billions of rubles taken from old 
people and children and thrown into the furnace of the war, and then after that even 
more money to prop up the thieving regime in Crimea…the ghoul needs a war. He needs 
the blood of the people.”  
-Boris Nemtsov   (Batou, 2015, p. 5) 
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Appendix I 
 In conducting this study I faced several limitations. The first, and most prevalent, 
was eliminating pre-existent bias. As a native of Ukraine, I have an established view on 
the topic; regardless of whether it is positive or negative. This immediately signals to 
subjectivity in the research. However, to maintain objectivity in such a sensitive case, I 
employed a systematic approach in my content analysis to ensure that an unbiased party 
would reach the same results that I did.  
To accomplish this, I read through the 57 sources several times and identified 
specific phrases that were consistently repeated throughout the rhetoric. These codes then 
served to identify key trends/justifications, which were subsequently compiled in a chart. 
After each justification (8 in total) was totaled, I was able to view the frequency with 
which Putin mentioned each individual justification throughout the rhetoric. At this point, 
I was able to make comparisons amongst the categories, presenting them in the order of 
most frequently mentioned to least frequently mentioned. From this, I took a qualitative 
approach in detailing the context that surrounded each individual justification.  
Objectivity in this study was paramount in order to produce valid results and 
present a method of research that was replicable to similar cases. I consider this study to 
be replicable and applicable. The rhetoric of elites can be very telling. This study 
provides a glimpse into the use of framing by elites and the significance and implications 
of such a strategy. 
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Appendix II 
The following is the collection of 57 speeches, interviews, addresses and excerpts that were chosen for this study. The chart 
includes the date, audience, title, small description and source of each case. The cases are organized by date: 
Spch/Int/Add Date Audience  Title  What for  Source 
Speech  Feb. 7th 
2007 
Munich, Germany  “Peace Through Dialogue” 43rd Munich Conference on 
Security Policy  
BBC News 
Article by Putin  Feb. 7th 
2012  
Kommersant (Russian 
Paper) 
“Russia Must Reject 
Corruption and Build a 
Modern Democracy” 
Piece from “Kommersant” The Gaurdian  
Article by Putin  Sep. 12 
2013 
American audience “A Plea for Caution from 
Russia” 
What Putin has to say to 
Americans on Syria 
The Gaurdian  
Speech  Dec. 12 
2013 
Both houses of 
parliament, State 
Duma, Federal Council 
“State of the Nation 
Speech” 
Presidential Address to the 
Federal Assembly  
Russian Federation  
Press Statement/Answer to 
journalists’ questions  
Jan. 28 
2014 
Brussels, international  “Vladimir Putin took part in 
the Russia-EU summit 
meeting” 
News Conference following 
the Russia-EU summit  
Official Kremlin website  
Answer journalists’ questions  Mar. 4 
2014 
Novo-Ogoryovo, 
Moscow Region 
"Vladimir Putin answered 
journalists’ questions on 
the situation in Ukraine” 
Answer to questions on 
Ukraine  
Official Kremlin website 
Excerpts Mar. 5 
2014 
Europe “Ukraine Crisis: What are 
Putin’s Calculations?” 
Excerpts on situation in 
Ukraine 
BBC News 
Speech  Mar. 18 
2014 
Federation council, 
state Duma, Reps of 
Crimea and 
Sevastopol/public 
“Transcript: Putin says 
Russia will Protect the 
Rights of Russians Abroad” 
Remarks after the 
“reunification of Crimea with 
Russia 
The Washington Post  
Excerpts  Mar. 29 
2014 
Europe  "Ukraine Crisis: Russia 
vows no invasion” 
Remarks on further 
advancement into Ukraine 
BBC News 
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Interview May 23 
2014 
International  "Putin to Ukraine: We Will 
Accept the Legitimacy of 
your Illegitimate Election” 
CNBC Interview Novosti Kremlin 
Interview Jun. 4 
2014 
International  "Putin speaks out on 
Ukraine, Crimea and US 
relations with French 
Media” 
Interview in Sochi to French 
Media with Gilles Bouleau 
and Jean-Pierre 
Elkabbach                  Media 
TF1 and Europe 1 
RT Official  
Excerpts/Remarks  Jun. 27 
2014 
Europe  “Ukraine: Putin aide brands 
Poroshenko ‘Nazi’ ahead of 
EU deal” 
Remarks of Senior Advisor to 
Russian President Sergei 
Glazyev  
BBC News 
Excerpts/Remarks  Aug. 31 
2014 
Europe  "Putin ‘urges talks on 
statehood for east 
Ukraine’” 
Putin called for talks to 
discuss statehood of east 
Ukraine 
BBC News 
Speech  Oct. 25 
2014 
Valdai International 
Discussion Club 
“Putin’s speech at the 
Valdai Club- Full 
Transcript” 
Speech to the XI meeting of 
the Valdai Club  
The Vineyard of the Saker 
Interview Nov. 7 
2014 
Russian Television “Vladimir Putin announces 
itself in the Ukraine Crisis 
to speak: The Kremln 
Leader Alleged that the 
Russian Army had the right 
to military intervention in a 
neighboring country.” 
TV Question time with “Direct 
Line” Putin raises serious 
allegations against the 
government in Kiev 
National Turkish  
Excerpts from Interview  Nov. 24 
2014 
TASS- International  “Excerpts From Vladimir 
Putin’s Latest Interview” 
Interview with Andrei 
Bandenko of TASS  
Forbes 
Interview Nov. 27 
2014 
International/Europe “Interview with President 
Vladimir Putin: The Crisis 
in East Ukraine, The 
Sanctions Regime, 
Russian-German 
Relations” 
Interview with Hubert Seipel 
for the German TV Channel 
ARD. Took place in 
Vladivostok on Nov. 13 
Global Research  
Speech/Address Dec. 5 
2014 
Domestic/Russia “Putin Defends Foreign 
Policy in State Address” 
Putin defending the Kremlin’s 
foreign policy in the State 
Address 
Aljazeera 
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5
 
Meeting/Answers to Questions Dec. 5 
2014 
Kremlin, Moscow “Meeting with the members 
of the Council for Civil 
Society and Human Rights 
and federal and regional 
human rights 
commissioners” 
Meeting examined current 
issues regarding respect for 
human rights and 
development of civil society 
institutions in all the regions 
Official Kremlin Website 
Excerpts  Dec. 5 
2014 
World, Russia “Putin Cut Ukraine 
Criticism from Speech 
Ahead of Peace Talks” 
Denotes points on Ukraine 
said by Putin that were 
dropped from the previous 
meeting 
TIME 
Speech Excerpt Dec. 18 
2014 
Russian State Media  “Russian state media 
promo for Putin speech: 
‘the Bear Never Asks 
Permission’” 
Odd state media promo 
ahead of the President’s 
annual news conference  
CNN 
Speech Excerpt Dec. 18 
2014 
Domestic/Russia "Putin speech sparks more 
ruble volatility” 
Putin blames external factors 
for Russia’s ongoing 
economic problems  
NBC 
News Conference Dec. 18 
2014 
Moscow/Russia “News Conference of 
Vladimir Putin" 
President’s News conference 
broadcast by: Channel 1, 
Rossiya-1, Rossiya-2, 
Rossiya-24, Radio Rossii, 
Mayak and Vesti FM + 
Russian and Foreign 
Journalists 
Official Kremlin Website 
Speech  Jan. 01 
2015 
Domestic/Russia “Putin: Crimea annexation 
important milestone” 
New Year’s Speech to the 
Nation this time on Crimea  
Aljazeera 
Interview Feb. 02 
2015 
Domestic/Russia “President Vladimir Putin’s 
Interview with VGTRK” 
Putin answered questions 
from the National State 
Television and Radio 
Company (VGTRK) journalist 
Vladimir Solovyov 
Russian Mission 
Interview Excerpts  Feb. 24 
2015 
Russia  "Ukraine conflict: Russia’s 
Vladimir Putin says war 
‘unlikely’” 
Excerpts from an interview 
with Russian Television on 
situation in Ukraine 
BBC News 
Excerpts Feb. 28 
2015 
Europe  “Boris Nemtsov murder 
prompts Putin ‘justice’ 
pledge” 
Remarks made by Putin and 
mourners following Nemtsov’s 
murder 
BBC News 
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Meeting/Press Statement Mar. 20 
2015 
Domestic/Russia “Press Statement following 
a meeting between the 
presidents of Russia, 
Belarus and Kazhakstan” 
Statement after meeting with 
Belarus and Kazhakstan 
regarding relations and 
Ukraine” 
Kremlin Official Website 
Answer to journalists’ questions Apr. 16 
2015 
Moscow/Russia “Answers to journalists’ 
questions after Direct Line” 
Putin met with media 
representatives to answer 
questions after interview on 
Russian Television  
Kremlin Official Website  
Excerpts from Interview  Apr. 18 
2015 
Moscow/Russia "Putin extends unexpected 
peace offering to U.S. in 
media interview” 
Excerpts from interview with 
Russia’s state-backed 
television station 
Washington Examiner  
Speech  May 9 
2015 
Moscow/Russia  “Victory Day Speech”  Speech in the Red Square on 
Victory Day commending 
Russians on the defeat of 
Nazis  
World Future Fund  
Press Statement/ Answer to 
journalists’ questions 
May 10 
2015 
Moscow/Russia "Press statement and 
replies to journalists’ 
questions following talks 
with Federal Chancellor of 
Germany Angela Merkel  
Press statements and 
answers to questions on 
Russian-German Relations 
Official Kremlin Website  
Excerpts from news conference May 10 
2015 
Moscow/Russia “Putin: Russia can 
influence E. Ukraine but its 
up to Kiev to solve crisis” 
Important excerpts from news 
conference with Angela 
Merkel  
Russia Today 
Interview  Jun 7 
2015  
International  "Vladimir Putin, interview 
for the Italian Newspaper “Il 
corriere della Sera”  
Russian Italian-Relations and 
situation in Ukraine  
Corrirere 
Panel Discussion Jun 19 
2015 
Russia  "Putin: Russia is not 
aspiring to superpower 
status, just wants to be 
respected” 
Discussion during the plenary 
meeting of the 19th St. 
Petersburg International 
Economic forum 2015 
Russia Today  
Yanukovich interview Jun 22 
2015 
Europe  "Ukraine Crisis: 
Yanukovich Regrets 
Bloodshed in Kiev” 
Interview with Yanukovich 
which contains remarks about 
Putin when Yan. was ousted  
BBC News 
Excerpt from meeting  Jul 3 2015 Russia  “Putin: We don’t expect any 
change in hostile policies 
toward Russia” 
Meeting of the country’s 
security council 
Russia Today  
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Excerpt from interview  Jul. 20 
2015 
International  "Ukraine Crisis: ‘Putin is 
obsessed with the idea of 
testing Nato’ - and the 
Baltics will be next, says 
Odessa governor Mikheil 
Sakhashvili 
interview with Sakhashvilli 
with regard to Putin, some 
mention of remarks made by 
Putin  
Independent  
Answer journalists’ questions  Aug. 18 
2015 
Russia/Sevastopol  “Answer to Journalists’ 
Questions” 
Answers journalists’ questions 
after examining the ancient 
shipwreck near the entrance 
to Balaklava Bay in 
Sevastopol  
Official Kremlin Website  
Answer to journalists' questions  Sep. 4 
2015 
Russia/Vladivostok  "Vladimir Putin answered 
Russian journalists’ 
questions” 
Answered questions on 
current issues such as: 
Russian economy’s 
development outlook, oil 
prices, russia’s social policy, 
the situation in Ukraine, 
refugees, terrorism 
Official Kremlin Website  
Answer journalists’ questions  Sep. 12 
2015 
Russia/Sevastopol  “Answer to Journalists’ 
Questions” 
Vladimir Putin and former 
Italian Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi answered to 
journalists’ questions  
Official Kremlin website 
Speech  Sep. 28 
2015 
International/Europe  "transcript: Putin’s Speech 
Before UN General 
Assembly” 
Putin addressed the UN 
General Assembly  
Washington Post  
Interview Sep. 29 
2015 
American Audience  "President Putin Interview 
with Charlie Rose” 
Interview with Charlie Rose to 
American TV Stations CBS 
and PBS on Ukraine  
Official Kremlin website 
Interview Oct. 12 
2015 
Russia/ Int’l "Vladimir Putin rules out 
ground operations in Syria: 
Russian President’s 
Rossiya TV interview in 
full” 
Interview on Syria and fight 
against terrorism, Putin 
accuses US and Europe of 
not offering results in the fight 
against terrorism  
Independent  
Excerpt  Oct. 14 
2015 
International  “Trudeau faces the ‘Putin 
Test’” 
Trudeau and Putin exchange 
on situation in Ukraine  
The Leader Post  
Answers to journalists’ questions  Nov. 16 
2015 
Russia/ Antalya “Responses to journalists’ 
questions following the 
G20 Summit” 
Answers to questions on 
Turkey and Ukraine following 
the G-20 summit  
Official Kremlin website 
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Meeting  Dec. 10 
2015 
Moscow/Russia "Meeting with Head of 
Chechnya Ramzan 
Kadyrov” 
Briefing by Kadyrov on the 
socioeconomic situation in the 
region. interchange between 
Putin and Kadyrov  
Official Kremlin website 
Press Conference  Dec. 17 
2015 
Moscow/International  "Vladimir Putin press 
conference: ‘Russian 
Military personnel were in 
Ukraine’ - as it happened  
Russian President holds 
annual press conference with 
Russian and International 
journalists in Moscow— 
Military presence in Ukraine 
The Gaurdian  
Press Conference  Dec. 17 
2015 
Russia  "Vladimir Putin’s Annual 
News Conference” 
Annual Press Conference, 
discussion on 
Ukraine   Rossiya-1, Rossiya-
24, Channel One  
Official Kremlin website 
Law in Writing  Dec. 30 
2015 
Russia  “Law on suspending free 
trade agreement with 
Ukraine” 
The President signed Federal 
Law On Suspension by the 
Russian Federation of the 
Agreement on the Free Trade 
Zone with regard to Ukraine  
Official Kremlin website 
Interview  Jan 5 
2016 
International/Europe “Part one of January 5, 
2016 interview with 
Russian President Vladimir 
Putin by Germany’s Bild 
Newspaper” 
Interview with German Bild 
Newspaper held in Sochi, 
Russia. Part one of interview 
New Cold War  
Excerpt from interview  Jan 11 
2016 
International/Europe "Russian President views 
relations with West, NATO 
Expansion, Ukraine 
Confict” 
“For me, it is not borders that 
matter” 
BBC Monitoring Europe  
Speech Excerpt Jan 25 
2016 
International  "Vladimir Putin Accuses 
Lenin of placing a ‘time 
bomb’ under Russia”  
Putin denounced Lenin and 
the Bolshevik government  
The Guardian  
Conference Feb. 18 
2016 
International/Europe “Munich Security 
Conference: Talking 
Peace, Russian Style” 
Russian Prime Minister Dmitri 
Medvedev was send to 2016 
Munich Security Council to 
speak on Russia’s behalf  
The Moscow Times  
Speech Excerpt Feb. 18 
2016 
International/Europe "Putin Blasts EU 
Statements on Sanctions 
Relief” 
Minsk Deal and lifting the 
sanctions against Moscow 
The Moscow Times  
Excerpt Feb. 21 
2016 
International/Russia "Putin: US and NATO want 
to sit on the throne in 
Sanctions are a geopolitical 
strategy, defending his 
DW 
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9
 
Europe alone” policies in Ukraine and 
Crimea 
Press Conference Feb. 22 
2016 
International “G-20: Putin’s Speech 
significantly different than 
official transcript?”  
Press conference following 
the G-20 summit  
TND 
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